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ABSTRACT 
 
The recent triumph of holdout bondholders over Argentina in U.S. 
court litigation arising out of Argentina’s 2001 default on its sovereign 
bonds has renewed calls for the creation of an internationally-
administered sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM).  Such a 
“sovereign bankruptcy” mechanism is needed, supporters have argued, 
because future Argentina-style holdout litigation could undermine the 
ability of sovereigns to reach equitable restructurings.  This Article ar-
gues that the danger of future disruptive sovereign debt litigation in U.S. 
courts is overstated.  A close analysis of the legal basis for U.S. court deci-
sions in the Argentina litigation suggests that it will be difficult for fu-
ture holdout creditors to replicate this strategy against other foreign sov-
ereigns.  U.S. law still grants foreign sovereigns enormous and nearly 
insurmountable legal advantages in U.S. courts over private creditors.  
While there may be good reasons to create an SDRM, the fear of future 
Argentina-style U.S. litigation is not one of those reasons. 
                                                     
*  Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, John 
Dewitt Gregory Research Scholar, and Faculty Director of International Programs, 
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University.  This Article draws in part 
on two presentations the author made in 2013.  The first, at an event hosted by the 
Emerging Markets Trading Association in London, explored the international 
consequences of U.S. litigation against Argentina.  The second, hosted by the Cato 
Institute in Washington D.C., examined the Argentinian litigation from both legal 
and macroeconomic perspectives.  Both presentations enabled the author to inter-
act with practitioners and investors interested in the overall Argentina debt situa-
tion.  The author would like to acknowledge research support from the Maurice 
A. Deane School of Law and the Federalist Society. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2001, the government of Argentina defaulted on over $80 bil-
lion in sovereign debt,1 which remains one of the largest sovereign 
debt defaults in history.  Although Argentina was later able to win 
agreement from a majority of its bondholders to restructure much 
of that debt at a considerable discount, a group of investment 
funds and small private investors continued to demand to be paid 
in full.  These holdout creditors engaged Argentina in a no-holds-
barred legal struggle in U.S. federal courts that led to five separate 
U.S. Supreme Court petitions for certiorari,2 one Supreme Court 
decision,3 and an eventual legal triumph for those holdout credi-
tors.4 
The legal victories of holdout creditors in U.S. courts, which 
has led Argentina to enter into another default, has already 
spurred new calls for the International Monetary Fund and leading 
nations to create a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism 
(“SDRM”) or some other kind of international mechanism to pro-
tect sovereign debtors from future Argentina-style holdout creditor 
litigation.  For many supporters of a SDRM, the ability of holdout 
creditors to use U.S. courts to force repayment of sovereign debt 
will undermine the ability of future sovereign debtors to negotiate 
a fair and equitable restructuring of distressed sovereign debt.5  A 
breakdown in restructurings, supporters further argue, would 
have deleterious effects on global financial markets as well as on 
                                                     
1  NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 201 (2013).  
2  Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 201, cert. denied 
(2013); Republic of Argentina v. EM Ltd., 131 S. Ct. 1474, cert. denied (2011); Aure-
lius Capital Partners, LP v. Republic of Argentina, 559 U.S. 988, cert. denied (2010); 
EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 552 U.S. 818, cert. denied (2007); Republic of Ar-
gentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819, cert. denied (2014). 
3  Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014) (affirm-
ing power of district court to order post-judgment discovery for overseas assets); 
EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 552 U.S. 818, cert. denied (2007). 
4  See, e.g., NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 
2013); NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2012). 
5  See, e.g., W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Anna Gelpern, Injunctions in Sovereign 
Debt Litigation, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 189 (2014) (asserting that injunctions in sover-
eign debt litigations are ineffective because by imposing costs to third parties they 
can hardly secure compliance of sovereign governments).  
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the ability of developing countries to provide necessary services to 
their citizens.6 
This Article does not dispute that a breakdown in the ability of 
sovereigns to restructure their distressed debt would be a serious 
problem, but it argues that it is unlikely future holdout creditors 
will be able to replicate the U.S. litigation strategy used against Ar-
gentina.  A close legal analysis of the Argentina cases reveals that 
foreign sovereigns maintain enormous advantages over private 
creditors when they default on their debt obligations.  Although 
creditors have often sought to enforce defaulted bonds against 
sovereign deadbeats in U.S. courts, such efforts have almost never 
succeeded.7  The legal victories against Argentina depended in no 
small degree on Argentina’s unusually aggressive strategy for 
dealing with holdout creditors, especially its decision to enact a 
“Lock Law” that prohibits any payment to holdouts. 
The Article begins in Part 1 by offering a brief history of Argen-
tina’s sovereign debt issuance, its 2002 default, its subsequent ef-
forts to restructure that debt, and its eventual defeat in U.S. court 
litigation at the hands of holdout bondholders.  In Part 2, the Arti-
cle reviews arguments made by scholars and policymakers in favor 
of a statutory sovereign debt restructuring mechanism to prevent 
future holdouts from using litigation to block the restructuring of 
distressed sovereign debt. 
Part 3 goes on to explain why, despite appearances to the con-
trary, U.S. law makes it nearly impossible to win an enforceable 
judgment in U.S. courts against a sovereign defaulting on its debt.  
The Article will then describe in detail the two creative legal strat-
egies used by the holdout creditors to overcome these obstacles 
against Argentina.  Only one of these strategies, the pari passu 
clause strategy, actually succeeded. 
                                                     
6  See, e.g., Felix Salmon, Annals of Ignoble Cowardice, Second Circuit Edition, 
REUTERS (Sept. 10, 2013), available at http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-
salmon/2013/09/10/annals-of-ignoble-cowardice-second-circuit-edition) (criti-
cizing decisions against Argentina as worse than allowing mere defaults). 
7  This has not prevented creditors from bringing lawsuits, which have in-
creased in recent years.  Julian Schumacher, Christoph Trebesch & Henrik Ender-
lein, Sovereign Defaults in Court, at 8–12, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2189997 (showing that there has been a rise in creditor 
litigation related to sovereign defaults in the United States and United Kingdom 
since 1976 and illustrating this rise in Figure 2, entitled “The rise of creditor litiga-
tion”).  Id. at 35.  
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In Part 4, the Article assesses the effect of these innovative legal 
strategies on the future of sovereign debt claims in U.S. courts.  It 
concludes that traditional and common sense legal analysis of the 
relevant bond contracts and immunity law supports U.S. courts’ 
decisions to grant an injunction to holdout creditors.  However, the 
decisions relied heavily on the unusually broad language in Argen-
tina’s pari passu clause and highlighted the unusual actions Argen-
tina has taken to lock out the holdout creditors.  Thus, it is likely 
that Argentina’s unusually aggressive strategy for dealing with its 
holdout creditors, especially its decision to adopt legislation pro-
hibiting payments to holdouts, was a crucial factor in the U.S. 
courts’ decisions.  In other words, the danger of holdout litigation 
to future foreign sovereigns can be avoided in many cases, and is 
manageable for the rest. 
 
1. BACKGROUND – ARGENTINA AND SOVEREIGN DEBT 
 
In 1994, the Republic of Argentina sold government bonds to 
foreign investors in New York and other international financial 
markets pursuant to a Fiscal Agency Agreement (FAA).  To ease 
investor concerns about their ability to recover payments in the 
event of default or nonpayment, Argentina agreed to give buyers 
of these FAA bonds a number of legal protections. 
First, Argentina agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of “any 
New York state or federal court sitting in the Borough of Manhat-
tan, The City of New York . . . over any suit, action, or proceeding 
against it or its properties, assets or revenues with respect to” the 
securities it issued.8 
Second, Argentina agreed to waive legal immunity defenses 
that sovereigns typically enjoy from the jurisdiction of domestic 
courts. 
Argentina “has irrevocably agreed not to claim and has irrevo-
cably waived such immunity to the fullest extent permitted by the 
laws of such jurisdiction and consents generally for the purposes of 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to the giving of any relief or 
                                                     
8  EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 720 F. Supp. 2d 273, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), 
vacated sub nom.  Terms and Conditions Governing the 10.000% New AR$ Global 
Bond due September 19, 2008, ISIN # XS0130278467, quoted in NML Capital, Ltd. 
& EM Ltd. v. Banco Cent. de la República Argentina, 652 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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the issue of any process in connection with any Related Proceeding 
or Related Judgment.”9  
The waiver went on to assure investors that Argentina also 
waived immunity to the fullest extent permitted for “any of its rev-
enues, assets or properties” that would otherwise be entitled to 
immunity “from attachment prior to judgment, from attachment in 
aid of execution of judgment, from execution of a judgment or 
from any other legal or judicial process or remedy.”10 
Finally, Argentina offered investors protection from subordina-
tion.  In what has become known as the pari passu clause, Argenti-
na declared that: 
 
The Securities will constitute . . . direct, unconditional, un-
secured and unsubordinated obligations of the Republic 
and shall at all times rank pari passu without any preference 
among themselves.  The payment obligations of the Repub-
lic under the Securities shall at all times rank at least equal-
ly with all its other present and future unsecured and un-
subordinated External Indebtedness.11 
 
Pursuant to these and other assurances, Argentina went on to 
raise billions of U.S. dollars from private investors in New York.  
By 2001, such debt amounted to approximately $80 billion. 
Beginning in 2001, Argentina began to suffer from economic 
and financial stresses that severely limited its ability to make pay-
ments on debt it owed to foreign investors, especially debt denom-
inated in U.S. dollars.  These domestic economic and political prob-
lems eventually led Argentina to announce in December 2001 that 
it was declaring a “temporary moratorium” on principal and inter-
est payments on all of its external debt, including the debt sold in 
New York.12 
This “temporary moratorium” was renewed each subsequent 
year until 2005 when Argentina reached an agreement with about 
76% of its private creditors to exchange the original 1994 debt for 
                                                     
9  Id.  
10  Id. 
11  NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 
2012) cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 201 (2013) (alteration in original). 
12  Id. 
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new bonds paying about 25 to 29 cents on the dollar.  In the course 
of offering these new exchange bonds, Argentina noted that it “has 
no intention of resuming payment on”13 any bonds not exchanged 
or tendered at the restructured rate.  Argentina’s legislature rein-
forced this statement by enacting a law prohibiting its president 
from “conducting any type of in-court, out-of-court or private set-
tlement with respect to the bonds”14 not tendered as part of the ex-
change offer.  This so-called “Lock Law” made it illegal under Ar-
gentina law for payment to be made to any creditors refusing to 
accept the new (much less valuable) bonds.15 
In 2010, Argentina again made an offer to exchange the original 
1994 debt for new (substantially less valuable) bonds.  It temporari-
ly suspended its “Lock Law” to do so and succeeded in attracting 
investors holding another 15% of its 1994 bonds.  Thus, by 2010, 
investors holding bonds worth about 91% of the 1994 issuance had 
agreed to the exchange.  Argentina then reinstated the Lock Law, 
ensuring that remaining creditors who were now holding bonds 
worth 9% of the remaining 1994 debt would not be paid.16 
At various times after Argentina announced its default in 2001, 
hedge funds affiliated with Elliott Associates began buying up Ar-
gentina’s 1994 debt (at a substantial discount).  Rather than accept-
ing the terms of the 2005 and 2010 exchange offers, the hedge 
funds (along with a number of original investors in the 1994 debt) 
continued to demand full payment.  NML, the lead Elliott-fund 
holding Argentine debt, filed lawsuits in 2009 and 2011.  Relying 
upon Argentina’s agreement to jurisdiction in New York courts, 
the funds demanded full payment on the defaulted 1994 debt.  As I 
will describe in more detail below in Part 4, the funds won judg-
ments against Argentina but were frustrated in their efforts to exe-
cute those judgments in U.S. courts. 
U.S. courts did accept the funds’ argument that the pari passu 
                                                     
13  Id. at 260. 
14  Id. at 252 (alteration in original). 
15  Id. at 252.  As one commentator noted, Argentina’s harsh line with its cred-
itors looks even harsher since it had by this time recovered enough foreign capital 
to actually pay off its debt with very modest debt service.  See Arturo C. Porzecan-
ski, Guest Post: Argentina Threw Its Creditors Under the Bus, FIN. TIMES, (NOV. 12, 
2013, 7:00 PM), http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2013/11/12/guest-post-
argentina-threw-its-creditors-under-the-bus/ (criticizing that Argentina aggres-
sively restructured the public debt). 
16  NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, at 252–53. 
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clause in Argentina’s bond contracts allowed the hedge funds to 
demand “equal treatment” with bondholders who had accepted 
Argentina’s less favorable exchanges in 2005 and 2010.17  This in-
terpretation, which Argentina failed to reverse in appeals to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, led to a standoff in the summer of 2014.  Ar-
gentina refused to pay the holdout hedge funds, but the U.S. court 
refused to allow Argentina to pay the other exchange bondholders, 
placing Argentina in a technical default.  As of the time of this 
writing, Argentina and its holdout creditors have failed to reach a 
settlement.18 
 
2. THE CALL FOR A SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING  
 
Long before Argentina’s default in July 2014, leading observers 
and policymakers were troubled by the precedents emerging from 
the Argentina litigation in the U.S.  Indeed, an earlier successful lit-
igation involving a similar pari passu strategy against Peru in the 
late 1990s led to serious discussions at the International Monetary 
Fund about the creation of an international treaty mechanism to 
protect sovereigns from disruptive litigation during default and re-
structuring of their debt.  In particular, experts were concerned 
that litigation by holdout creditors could impede a sovereign’s ef-
fort to restructure its debt with other creditors willing to accept re-
duced payments.  As a recent IMF study explains: 
 
While private creditors as a group may recognize that sup-
port for a rapid restructuring is in their own interest, they 
may hesitate to agree to a restructuring out of concern that 
other creditors may hold out and press for full payment on 
the original terms after the agreement has been reached. 
Thus, collective action problems could either make restruc-
turing unsuccessful due to the holdout strategy or cause de-
                                                     
17  See discussion, infra Part 3.2. 
18  See Peter Eavis, Argentine Debt Dispute Remains Murky Even as London Court 
Sheds Some Light, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2015, 6:32 PM), available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/02/13/argentine-debt-dispute-remains-
murky-even-as-london-court-sheds-some-light/ (describing continuing deadlock 
between Argentina and its holdout creditors).   
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lay due to uncertainty about creditor participation.19 
 
Discussions at the IMF centered on a “sovereign debt restruc-
turing mechanism” (SDRM) that would address this “collective ac-
tion” problem.  An SDRM would allow a sovereign to call a “tem-
porary standstill” in a manner akin to the protections from creditor 
litigation provided by bankruptcy under domestic law.  In a do-
mestic bankruptcy, a debtor is protected from creditors’ lawsuits 
while it undergoes restructuring.  In the SDRM framework, the 
IMF would play a role in evaluating the sovereign ability to pay its 
debts and decide on what level of “haircut” or reduction bond-
holders would have to accept.20 
Proponents of the SDRM mechanism argue that it would stabi-
lize international financial markets when a sovereign faces the 
stresses on its ability to make its debt payments.  It would encour-
age sovereigns to restructure their debt earlier rather than try to 
borrow their way out of their debt crisis.  Crucially, it would also 
shield sovereigns from holdout creditors and domestic litigation.21  
The SDRM concept appeared to receive support from the IMF’s 
staff, but it ultimately failed to win broad support from the IMF’s 
shareholders.  Instead, the Fund suggested that sovereigns add col-
lective action clauses to their bond contracts that would allow them 
(via contract law) to eliminate holdout creditors’ claims once a cer-
tain threshold of support from other bondholders is reached.  Such 
Collective Action Clauses (“CACs”) were believed to provide a 
private sector solution to the problem the SDRM was designed to 
address.22   
The fallout from Argentina’s July 2014 default has renewed 
calls to consider the SDRM or some other legal mechanisms to pro-
tect sovereign debtors from holdouts.  For instance, the Brookings 
Institution issued a report calling for amendments to both the Eu-
                                                     
19  Sovereign Debt Restructuring – Recent Developments and Implications for the 
Fund’s Legal and Policy Framework, Apr. 26, 2013, at 12 [hereinafter IMF], available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/042613.pdf. 
20  Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director, Int’l Monetary Fund, In-
ternational Financial Architecture for 2002:  
A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Nov. 26, 2001), available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/112601.htm. 
21  Id.  
22  IMF, supra note 19, at 12. 
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ropean mechanisms of debt restructuring as well as for a greater 
role for the IMF.  Citing the Argentina judgments in U.S. courts, 
the report called for a “Sovereign Debt Adjustment Facility” that 
would, inter alia, provide a shield for sovereigns seeking to restruc-
ture their debt.23 
Other critics of the U.S. court rulings also noted how the U.S. 
litigation highlights the needs for a “sovereign bankruptcy” mech-
anism.  Otherwise, “[t]he balance of power will be tipped strongly 
away from debtors toward their creditors; there will be little incen-
tive for debtors toward their creditors; there will be little incentive 
for creditors to negotiate with troubled sovereigns.”24  These con-
cerns were echoed by the Secretary General of the Organization of 
American States, who suggested that the U.S. courts’ decisions do  
 
not only threaten… the financial stability of [Argentina; 
they] also wreak . . . havoc [on] the sovereign debt restruc-
turing mechanisms that have been developed over time, 
[and] with the acquiescence of international lending agen-
cies, to enable numerous countries to overcome their debt 
crises and embark once again on a path to growth.25 
 
Similarly, Professor Diane Desierto called the Argentina cases 
“an extreme example of the pathological consequences to the ab-
sence of a binding international treaty that would assist sovereigns 
in the coordination of debt restructuring with all holders of gov-
                                                     
23  LEE C. BUCHHEIT ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POL’Y & 
REFORM, REVISITING SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY 31–33 (2013) available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/10/sovereign-debt (arguing 
for a limited “statutory reform” to deal with holdout problem). 
24  Brett House, Argentina’s Debt Saga Shows Why We Need a Better Way to Deal 
with Bankrupt Countries, QUARTZ (Mar. 24, 2014), available at 
http://qz.com/191388/argentinas-debt-saga-shows-why-we-need-a-better-way-
to-deal-with-bankrupt-countries/; see also Robin Wigglesworth & Alan Beattie, 
Bankruptcy Regime for Nations Urged, FIN. TIMES  (Jan. 6, 2013), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ad3068d6-4613-11e2-ae8d-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3BqXlOAOf (discussing the justifications for implement-
ing a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, such as the one proposed by the 
IMF in 2002). 
25  Press Release, Org. of Am. States, Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of the OAS Supports Argentina in the Restructuring of its Sover-
eign Debt (July 3, 2014), available at 
http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-286/14. 
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ernmental debt.”26 
This section illustrates, however, that supporters of an SDRM 
have repeatedly cited the Argentina litigation in U.S. courts as a 
major factor in why an SDRM is needed.  The merit of an SDRM is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  As I will argue in subsequent sec-
tions, however, these SDRM supporters are overstating the threat 
of future copycat Argentina holdout litigations. 
 
3. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN DEBTORS IN U.S. COURTS 
 
As one of the world’s largest financial markets, it is not surpris-
ing that sovereign governments have commonly used New York 
financial institutions to borrow money, or to underwrite bond of-
ferings to the general public.  It is also not surprising that New 
York courts, both federal and state, have become a common U.S. 
venue for litigation between creditors and sovereign states that 
have defaulted on their loans or bond offerings. 
Although defaulting sovereigns have often been sued in New 
York and other U.S. courts, the success record of such lawsuits is 
extremely low.  The reason for the failure of most creditor lawsuits 
is the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity.  This doctrine, 
drawn from the international law of sovereign immunity, limits the 
ability of domestic U.S. courts to assert jurisdiction over foreign 
sovereigns and their assets.  As articulated by Chief Justice Mar-
shall, one sovereign “can be supposed to enter a foreign territory 
only under an express license, or in the confidence that the immun-
ities belonging to his independent sovereign station . . . will be ex-
tended to him.”27  The dignities and rights accruing to a sovereign 
under international law prohibit the exercise of another sovereign’s 
powers over it or its assets. 
U.S. courts honored Marshall’s injunction for most of the next 
150 years.  Indeed, even in cases where the sovereign expressly 
                                                     
26  Diane Desierto, Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital Ltd.: The Global Reach 
of Creditor Execution on Sovereign Assets and the Case for an International Treaty on 
Sovereign Restructuring, EJIL: TALK! (June 22, 2014), 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/republic-of-argentina-v-nml-capital-ltd-the-global-
reach-of-creditor-execution-on-sovereign-assets-and-the-case-for-an-international-
treaty-on-sovereign-restructuring/. 
27  Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 137 (1812). 
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waived any immunity it possessed, U.S. courts traditionally al-
lowed such sovereigns to revoke the waiver and reassert immunity 
once a lawsuit arose.28  The adherence of U.S. courts to the im-
munity of foreign sovereigns, and the revocability of waiver, 
meant that defaulting sovereigns almost always escaped the juris-
diction of U.S. (usually New York) courts in lawsuits brought by 
angry creditors. 
The principle of absolute immunity for all foreign sovereigns 
began to change shortly after World War II when the U.S. State 
Department announced it would no longer recommend immunity 
for sovereigns acting in a commercial capacity.29  This rise of the 
principle of “restrictive” immunity, later codified and expanded in 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),30 allowed creditors 
to overcome sovereign immunity pursuant to certain exceptions.  
With respect to waiver, the FSIA clarified that once a foreign gov-
ernment waived its immunity, it could not subsequently revoke 
that waiver.31 
Yet the shift away from absolute immunity did not automati-
cally benefit creditors of sovereign debtors.  To be sure, sovereign 
borrowers like Argentina often waive their immunity from the ju-
risdiction of U.S. courts.  This waiver subjects them to money 
judgments for non-payment.  But though creditors might win 
money judgments, the FSIA still severely limits the power of courts 
                                                     
28   
In a 1961 case, Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, the State Department’s suggestion 
of immunity for Cuba opined that an ex ante waiver of immunity ‘is 
binding only on the conscience of the sovereign and, once given, may be 
revoked at will.’  Memorandum for the United States [In Opposition to 
Application for Stay of Mayan Lines, S.A.], 1 I.L.M. 276, 297 (1961).   
W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt, 2014 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 67, 73 n.27 (2014).  This rule was long recognized in U.S. courts - see Beers v. 
State of Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 529 (1857) (stating that a sovereign state, even after 
previously waiving its immunity from suit, “may withdraw its consent whenever 
it may suppose that justice to the public requires it.”). 
29  See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. DEPT. of STATE, to 
Philip B. Perlman, Acting U.S. Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 
DEP’T. ST. BULL. 984, 984–85 (1952) (discussing and explaining the U.S. govern-
ment’s altered position that un-consenting foreign governments would no longer 
receive absolute immunity in U.S. courts for certain types of cases). 
30 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 
(1976), codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1990).   
31  28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1). 
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to execute those money judgments against a sovereign’s assets or 
property. 
Most notably, although the FSIA opened the door to execution 
against sovereign assets used for the “commercial activity in the 
United States,” it continues to shield all other sovereign assets from 
execution.32  Thus, a sovereign debtor like Argentina can essential-
ly ignore a money judgment against it by keeping whatever funds 
it uses for commercial activities outside the jurisdiction of a U.S. 
court.  All other assets remain execution-proof.  This includes offi-
cial governmental assets for conducting diplomatic activities or for 
conducting financial transactions for official government accounts. 
Additionally, the FSIA goes out of its way to make clear that 
certain other sovereign military-related assets are also immune 
from execution, whether or not the sovereign had issued a general 
waiver of immunity.33  Thus, even though Argentina has issued a 
waiver of immunity it might claim from “attachment,” U.S. law 
limits this waiver to assets Argentina uses for a commercial pur-
pose.  To prevent any of its holdout creditors from collecting on the 
defaulted debt, a sovereign debtor like Argentina simply keeps 
such assets outside of New York. 
In sum, a sovereign who waives its immunity from both juris-
diction and execution in a U.S. court is actually exposing itself to 
very little liability.  It can almost never be forced to pay on those 
debts because it can move any attachable assets out of the jurisdic-
tion before execution.  Unless the sovereign has assets used for 
commercial activities in the U.S., the sovereign can continue to op-
erate freely within the U.S. jurisdiction without any fear of attach-
ment or execution.  It is not surprising that many commentators 
have described sovereign debtors as essentially litigation-proof.34 
Facing these legal obstacles, it is surprising that any creditors 
bother to file lawsuits against sovereign bond issuers in U.S. courts 
and even more surprising that SDRM supporters cite such litiga-
tion as a threat to sovereign debt restructurings.  Yet Argentina’s 
                                                     
32  See, e.g., 28 USC § 1609 (giving immunity to foreign state property unless 
qualifying under exceptions in section 1610).  
33  28 U.S.C. § 1611. 
34  See, e.g., Weidemaier, supra note 28, at 69 n.8 (noting that “many lawsuits 
and arbitration claims arising out of Argentina’s 2001 default are still pending, 
without creditors recovering a cent.”), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2180228. 
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holdout creditors have developed two strategies to overcome these 
immunity-from-execution defenses.  Both of these strategies, while 
innovative, have faced strong opposition from experts in the field 
of sovereign debt as well as from the U.S. government.  And only 
one of these approaches has succeeded in court. 
 
3.1. The Central Bank Assets 
 
As noted above, the FSIA explicitly protects the property of a 
“foreign central bank or monetary authority held for its own ac-
count”35 from execution or attachment.  The policy basis for this 
immunity appears to be Congress’ concern that to do otherwise 
would discourage foreign central banks from depositing their re-
serves in New York.36 
Yet, as NML and other holdout creditors have argued, this im-
munity should not apply to the Banco Central de la República Ar-
gentina (BCRA), Argentina’s central bank.  First of all, some central 
banks are not legally or functionally independent from their sover-
eign governments, and at least one district court agreed that where 
such central banks lack independence, their assets should be at-
tributable to the sovereign.37 
Second, not all of the assets in the BCRA, even if independent, 
are held for the BCRA.  NML argued that those assets were actual-
ly being used by the government of Argentina to pay other debt-
ors, most notably the bondholders who had agreed to exchange 
their bonds in 2005.  In this way, NML and other creditors sought 
to read the FSIA’s language limiting immunity to property held for 
the central banks’ “own account” to exclude assets being funneled 
                                                     
35  28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1).  
36  See S. REP. No. 94-1310, at 31–32 (1976) (explaining that the policy behind 
giving immunity to central bank funds from execution is to prevent foreign funds 
from being discouraged to deposit in the United States). 
37  See EM Ltd. v. The Republic of Argentina, 720 F.Supp.2d 273, 300–01 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding that the Republic of Argentina’s exercise of control over 
funds held by BCRA was “entirely inconsistent with any idea of central bank in-
dependence” and accordingly that BCRA was the alter ego of the Republic of Ar-
gentina), vacated sub nom.  NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Cent. de la República Ar-
gentina, 652 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2011).  
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through the BCRA to other bondholders.38 
Third, NML argued that Argentina’s broad waiver of immunity 
defense from attachment should be interpreted to include a waiver 
of defenses for its central bank. 
Although the holdout creditors managed to convince one dis-
trict court to allow attachment of certain assets in the BCRA,39 this 
decision was eventually reversed by the Second Circuit.40  The ap-
peals court held that the central bank’s independence had nothing 
to do with whether it was protected from attachment.41  It further 
held that courts should adopt a presumption that all of a central 
bank’s assets are immune from liability, placing on plaintiffs the 
burden of rebutting this presumption.42  To rebut the presumption, 
plaintiffs must demonstrate with specificity that the funds are not 
being used “for central banking functions as such functions are 
normally understood, irrespective of their commercial nature.”43  
Applying this test to the BCRA, the Second Circuit held that 
plaintiffs could not overcome the presumption that all of the assets 
belonged to the BCRA.  Taking note of Argentina’s “appalling rec-
ord of keeping its promises to its creditors,” it nonetheless dis-
missed the holdout creditors’ action.44  The plaintiffs appealed to 
the Supreme Court, but the Court denied review. 
 
3.2. Pari Passu 
 
Though they failed to attach Argentina’s central bank assets, 
the holdout creditors simultaneously pursued a separate strategy 
to pierce Argentina’s immunity defenses.  This second (ultimately 
more successful) strategy focused courts on Argentina’s promise to 
treat all bonds as “direct, unconditional, unsecured and unsubor-
dinated obligations of the Republic and shall at all times rank pari 
                                                     
38  See EM Ltd. and NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina and Banco 
Cent. de la República Argentina, 2010 WL 2725571 (C.A.2), at 63–64 (2010). 
39  Id. at 303-04.  
40  NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Cent. de la República Argentina, 652 F.3d 172, 
194 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 23 (2012). 
41  Id. at 190. 
42  Id. at 196.  
43  Id. at 194. 
44  Id. 
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passu without any preference among themselves.”45 
The holdout creditors argued that this language prevented Ar-
gentina from giving preference to the exchange bondholders (those 
bondholders who had agreed to the restructured debt) over the 
holdouts.  Yet Argentina was not only regularly paying the ex-
change bondholders pursuant to the new (much reduced in value) 
bonds, but it enacted a Lock Law that made it illegal under Argen-
tina law to pay the holdouts at all.  Such differential treatment 
formally and legally subordinated the original bonds to the new 
exchange bonds.  The district court accepted this interpretation of 
the pari passu clause, stating that “it’s hard for me to believe that 
there is not a violation of the [Equal Treatment Provision] accom-
plished by the [Lock Law], simply saying that the Republic will not 
honor these judgments.”46  The district court then issued injunc-
tions blocking Argentina (and those working in active concert with 
Argentina) from making any payments to exchange bondholders 
unless it made comparable payments to holdout creditors as well.  
This interpretation of the boilerplate pari passu clause proved 
highly controversial.  The U.S. government took the unusual step 
of filing an amicus brief at the appeals court level opposing this in-
terpretation of the clause.47  Thus, Argentina (with the U.S. gov-
ernment in support), argued that the clause should be understood 
to allow different payments to different classes of bonds, as long as 
those bonds were given equal treatment when similarly situated.  
Hence, if the exchange bonds were defaulted, and Argentina only 
resumed payments for the exchange bonds and not the holdouts, 
then it would violate the pari passu clause.  In that case, the ex-
change bonds would have been given formal legal priority to the 
holdout creditors’ bonds.  But because there was no formal subor-
dination of the holdout creditor bonds here, Argentina argued it 
was not in violation. 
Furthermore, even if there was a violation, Argentina again 
sought the protection of the FSIA, arguing that the district court’s 
                                                     
45  NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 201 (2013). 
46  Id. at 254. 
47  Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of the 
Republic of Argentina’s Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, 
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 
12-105). 
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injunctions effectively operated extraterritorially by requiring Ar-
gentina to use assets held outside of New York to pay the holdout 
creditors.  The FSIA, Argentina argued, only allowed injunctions 
against property within the United States. 
This time, Argentina could not win over the Second Circuit.  
That court affirmed the district court’s interpretation of pari passu 
clause as a protection against more than simply formal subordina-
tion.48  It agreed with the lower court that the clause should also 
prevent de facto subordination, as Argentina was doing here by 
paying only exchange bondholders and enacting a Lock Law.  In-
deed, the Second Circuit emphasized that the Lock Law confirmed 
that the holdout creditor bonds had been formally subordinated.  
Since the exchange bonds could be enforced in Argentine courts, 
whereas the Lock Law specifically prohibited any payment to the 
holdouts, the Lock Law had both formally (as well as effectively) 
denied equal treatment to the holdout creditors. 
The Second Circuit also roundly rejected Argentina’s FSIA ar-
gument.  It held that while the FSIA did prohibit attachment of as-
sets outside the United States, including injunctions that operate as 
attachments, the district court’s injunctions did not do so here.  All 
of the district court’s injunctions required that Argentina comply 
with its contractual obligation in some way of its own choosing.  It 
could refuse to pay the exchange bondholders, for instance, or pay 
each set of bondholders a proportionate amount.  But the injunc-
tion did not “exercise dominion” over any of Argentina’s assets by 
directing particular overseas assets to be used for payment, or that 
any assets be used at all.  
While affirming the judgment, the Second Circuit remanded 
the case to the district court to clarify precisely how the injunction 
would apply to third parties and intermediary banks, and to ex-
plain the mechanics of the “ratable payment” formula for deter-
mining how much money must be paid to holdouts if Argentina 
makes payments to exchange bondholders.49  In November 2012, 
within weeks of the Second Circuit’s decision, the district court 
provided the requested clarification and strongly reaffirmed its ini-
tial injunction.  In August 2013, the Second Circuit again affirmed 
the district court, and in November 2013, it denied en banc review 
                                                     
48  NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012), 
cert. denied, 134 U.S. Ct. 201 (Oct. 7, 2013). 
49  Id. at 265. 
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before the entire appellate court.  Argentina filed a petition seeking 
Supreme Court review of this decision, but the Court denied certi-
orari in June 2014.50  The highest court’s refusal to hear Argentina’s 
case, or even to seek the views of the U.S. government, returned 
the case to the trial court, which had ordered Argentina to pay the 
holdouts or the court would block all payments to the exchange 
bondholders.  Despite a court-ordered mediation, Argentina and 
the holdout creditors failed to reach an agreement before payment 
on Argentina’s bonds became due on July 30th. 
 
4. ASSESSMENT 
 
The Second Circuit’s interpretation of the pari passu clause 
shocked numerous observers, especially those who had followed 
sovereign debt markets closely.  Reporters that had confidently 
predicted the Second Circuit’s rejection of the pari passu clause ar-
gument were now reporting that U.S. courts were threatening to 
undermine the world’s financial system by subjecting sovereign 
debt to dangerous new remedies.51  In the Second Circuit’s last 
consideration of this case, it was subjected to a virtual avalanche of 
amicus briefs from lawyers representing the exchange bondholders 
and the third party-agents, all of whom vociferously opposed the 
pari passu injunction.  The U.S. government supported these argu-
ments as well.  As explained in Part II, these observers have also 
suggested that drastic reforms are needed to respond to the results 
of these litigations.  But as I will argue in this section, the Second 
Circuit’s decision is based on solid legal foundations.  Moreover, 
the unique facts of this case suggest that it will be difficult for fu-
ture holdout creditors to replicate. 
 
                                                     
50  See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (holding to affirm the district court’s in-
junction order but denying enforcement until resolution by the U.S. Supreme 
Court).  
51  For instance, Felix Salmon at Reuters has been a relentless critic of the 
courts’ performance in these cases, especially the Second Circuit.  See, e.g., Salmon, 
supra note 6. 
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4.1. Law 
 
The vast majority of the pari passu criticism is a based on policy 
rather than law.  Put another way, few of the arguments raised by 
Argentina’s supporters offered legal arguments based upon con-
tractual or statutory text and traditional rules of contract interpre-
tation. 
This is not surprising because while the policy arguments 
against a broad reading of pari passu have substantial force, the le-
gal arguments are far from compelling. 
 
4.1.1. Pari Passu 
 
The pari passu language that ended up being central to Argenti-
na’s defeat has been a boilerplate feature of sovereign debt con-
tracts for over a century.52  Although they take different forms, al-
most all versions of the pari passu clause promise equal footing 
between different debt obligations.53 
The holdout creditors’ interpretation of pari passu was first ad-
vanced against Nicaragua and Peru in earlier lawsuits over sover-
eign debt defaults.  This interpretation of pari passu was bolstered 
by an opinion filed by Andreas Lowenfeld, an eminent scholar of 
international economic law at New York University.54  Lowenfeld 
argued that the most natural reading of pari passu is that a debtor 
must pay all creditors proportionately or ratably.55  Put another 
way, the pari passu language should be read to require payment to 
all creditors the same proportional amount.  Lowenfeld thus con-
cluded that simply stopping to make all payments to some credi-
tors, while making payments to others, violates the basic idea be-
                                                     
52  Mark Weidemaier, Robert Scott & Mitu Gulati, Origin Myths, Contracts, and 
the Hunt for Pari Passu, 38 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 72, 80–81 (2013) (recounting inter-
views with practicing lawyers about history of pari passu clause in sovereign debt 
contracts). 
53  See Anna Gelpern, SOVEREIGN DAMAGE CONTROL, in POL’Y BRIEF, May 2013, 
at 4 (Petersen Inst. for Int’l Econ. ed., 2013) (explaining the different forms of the 
pari passu clauses and their various effects). 
54  See id. 
55  See id. 
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hind the pari passu clause.56 
This opinion was endorsed by a Belgian court in 2000, when it 
blocked the payment agency Euroclear from paying Peru’s restruc-
tured creditors money unless the holdout creditors like Elliott were 
paid.  Rather than continue to litigate the meaning of pari passu, Pe-
ru settled with Elliott. 
Although the results of this reading raise policy problems (dis-
cussed below), it is hard to reject the legal foundations for this pari 
passu interpretation.  As the Second Circuit noted, the 1994 FAA 
instrument actually had two components.  In its first sentence, Ar-
gentina promised that the bonds would constitute “direct, uncon-
ditional, unsubordinated and unsecured obligations false.”57  In its 
second sentence, Argentina promised that the bonds shall “at all 
times rank at least equally with all its other present and future un-
secured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness.”58 
Argentina interpreted this language to protect bondholders 
against formal subordination in legal or administrative proceed-
ings.  It argued that this language should not be read to require de 
facto equality and proportional payments to all creditors outside of 
such proceedings.  But this reading of the pari passu language that 
was advanced by Argentina is hardly the most natural reading. 
Unlike Argentina’s interpretation, the holdout creditors’ read-
ing of this language gives meaning to both sentences.  In the first 
sentence, the FAA bond promised formal legal equality among all 
of the bonds issued.59  The FAA bond’s second sentence promised 
equality between the bonds and other debt obligations.60  The sec-
ond promise must mean something different from the first, and the 
most natural reading supports the view that it also prohibits de 
facto subordination of other debt. 
This reading thus fulfills the traditional interpretive principle 
for contracts:  that all terms in a contract should be given effect.  As 
Article 4.5 of the UNIDROIT Principles for International Commer-
cial Contracts puts it, “[c]ontract terms shall be interpreted so as to 
give effect to all the terms rather than to deprive some of them of 
                                                     
56  See id. at 3–4. 
57  NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 258–59 (2d Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, 134 U.S. Ct. 201 (Oct. 7, 2013).  
58  Id.  
59  Id. at 258.  
60  Id. 
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effect.”61  This principle should apply where the terms of the con-
tract are not clear. 
It is revealing that Argentina did not parse or explain this lan-
guage in its various briefs to the appellate court.  Rather, it simply 
asserted that pari passu is a boilerplate contract term that has only 
one reasonable interpretation.  As such, Argentina argued that a 
court must give the boilerplate term its plain meaning as evidenced 
by the words of the contract itself,62 in light of custom and usage.  
It then cited the authority of scholars, practitioners, and sovereign 
governments to buttress its claim that custom and usage should 
control the interpretation, and that other interpretations would 
lead to an absurd result. 
But the claim that only one “reasonable interpretation” exists 
belies Argentina’s reliance on claims of custom, usage, and ulti-
mately, policy.  Since the pari passu language had never been inter-
preted by courts in the sovereign context, and the testimony of 
market participants is hardly unanimous, Argentina’s argument 
ultimately relies on the strength and authority of its supporters ra-
ther than on the language of the pari passu clause itself. 
The weakness of Argentina’s reading of its pari passu clause, 
however, does not mean future litigants will be able to easily repli-
cate this strategy.  First, many pari passu clauses have much nar-
rower clauses than Argentina’s clause and tend to resemble the 
first sentence only.  For instance, a study of such clauses by 
Moody’s Investor Service found that more than half of sovereign 
debt bonds issued in the 2000s merely stated that “the bonds rank 
pari passu” without any further language.63  Unlike the Argentina 
pari passu clause, there is no specific reference to bonds that at all 
times rank at least equally with all its other present and future un-
secured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness.64 
                                                     
61  International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
(UNIDROIT), Principles of International Commercial Contracts 4.5 (1994). 
62  Brief of Defendant-Appellant Republic of Argentina at 32, NML Capital, 
Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-105). 
63  See Moody’s: Impact of Court Ruling on Argentina’s Debt on Future Sovereign 
Debt Restructurings Is Likely Limited, MOODY’S INVESTOR SERV. 2 (Mar. 4, 2014), 
available at http://factcheckargentina.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/Moodys-Report-March-2014.pdf. 
64  See id. (explaining that the decision in NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Ar-
gentina will likely not have a major impact on other future sovereign debt restruc-
turings). 
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And even if a future sovereign faced challenges based on the 
first sentence, it is unlikely they would face the same judicial cen-
sure as Argentina.  As I discussed above, Argentina enacted a 
“Lock Law” that formally subordinated the holdout creditors for 
the purposes of Argentina law and for the purposes of any pay-
ment.  The Second Circuit emphasized the Lock Law several times 
in affirming the lower court’s reading of the pari passu clause.  Un-
less a future sovereign acts similarly, it is doubtful that the pari pas-
su clause could be wielded against them so effectively. 
 
4.1.2. FSIA 
 
Argentina also invoked Section 1609 of the FSIA, which impos-
es a general limitation on the attachment or execution on sovereign 
property.65  As discussed above, the FSIA only permits attachments 
or execution on a narrow (and often non-existent) class of sover-
eign property used for a commercial activity. 
Having defeated the holdout creditors’ efforts to attach their 
central bank assets, Argentina invoked the same FSIA provisions 
against the district court’s pari passu injunction.  Though not an “at-
tachment,” Argentina argued that the injunction is effectively an 
attachment of assets that would otherwise be protected by the 
FSIA.66 
But the appeals court rejected this expansive reading of the 
FSIA.67  Injunctive relief that orders payment, but does not specify 
which assets or property should be used for that payment, is dis-
tinct from attachment or execution.  In fact, unlike an attachment of 
particular property, Argentina could comply with the injunction by 
simply stopping all payment to the exchange bondholders, thus 
giving all bonds equal treatment.  Or it could pay all the bond-
holders the amounts demanded.  Either action would comply with 
the injunction, which means Argentina may decide which property 
(if any) it uses to make payments.  Retaining discretion on which 
                                                     
65  28 U.S.C. § 1609 (“[T]he property in the United States of a foreign state 
shall be immune from attachment arrest and execution”). 
66  Id. 
67  NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 262 (2d Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, 134 U.S. Ct. 201 (Oct. 7, 2013) (“The Injunctions at issue here are 
not barred by § 1609.  They do not attach, arrest, or execute upon any property“). 
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property to use, and how to use that property, is hardly consistent 
with common-sense understandings of attachment. 
 
4.2. Policy 
 
Because Argentina’s legal arguments are far from a “slam 
dunk,” it has relied heavily on the specter of massive policy dislo-
cations from the Second Circuit’s reading of pari passu.  In these 
“End of the World” scenarios, other sovereigns who attempt to re-
structure their debt by freezing out holdouts will be subject to simi-
larly intensive and disruptive litigation.  Such litigation would af-
fect the ability of nations like Greece or Italy to work their way out 
of debt crises through the traditional means of restructuring.  At 
the very least, New York would likely lose out substantial business 
to the world’s other great sovereign debt market, London, as third-
party agents and banks get swept up in the creditor litigation.68 
These policy arguments are indeed serious, and they are fur-
ther buttressed by the views of institutions with the primary re-
sponsibility for managing policy toward sovereign debt markets:  
the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve Bank.  Indeed, in an ear-
lier case considering the pari passu clause, the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York described the pari passu enforcement strategy as “ter-
rorism of payments and settlements systems.”69 
There are good reasons, however, to think that any damaging 
policy consequences of the Second Circuit’s decision can be limited 
to Argentina and a few other seriously intransigent sovereign 
debtors.  As the U.S. government noted in its otherwise supportive 
amicus brief seeking en banc review of the Second Circuit decision, 
Argentina’s decision to enact a Lock Law is unique.  Because the 
Lock Law arguably imposes a formal statutory ranking of debt, 
and because other nations have almost never resorted to such a 
measure, the reading of narrower versions of the pari passu clause 
will likely be limited to Argentina’s special circumstances. 
Additionally, sovereigns are not helpless against holdouts.  
Many have adopted “collective action clauses” that allow sover-
                                                     
68  Gelpern, supra note 53, at 7.   
69  Id. at 5 (quoting Letter from Thomas C. Baxter, Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, to the Honorable Thomas P. Griesa, on Macrotecnic Int’l v. Argentina 
and EM Ltd. v. Argentina 1, 5 (Jan. 12, 2004). 
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eigns to squeeze out holdouts if creditors holding a super majority 
of the debt (such as 90%) agree to restructuring.  They could also 
strip pari passu language from their debt offerings.  Indeed, several 
sovereigns did so in reaction to the Second Circuit’s pari passu rul-
ing.  Such clauses are not a complete solution since creditors could 
still hold out if they muster holders of enough debt to block re-
structuring, but such clauses would still limit the number of future 
Argentina-like cases that might arise 70 
Pre-transaction planning could also defuse the criticisms of the 
injunctions from exchange bondholders and third-party intermedi-
aries like the Bank of New York that administer payments to ex-
change bondholders.  The depth of these third parties’ opposition 
is not surprising since they (and not Argentina), will bear the costs 
if Argentina does not comply with the injunction.  Professors Anna 
Gelpern and W. Mark C. Weidemaier argue in a recent article that 
these third party costs are unfair since third parties would bear the 
costs of Argentina’s actions.71  While there is some force to this ar-
gument, it is possible that the authors are exaggerating the costs.  
While payment intermediaries may face some minor monitoring 
costs, the only serious cost facing these third parties is contempt of 
court if they defy the district court’s injunction and continue to pay 
the exchange bondholders.  But Argentina cannot force the third 
parties to violate the injunction.  So as long as they comply with 
the injunction, the third parties (excepting the exchange bondhold-
ers) face few serious costs. 
The exchange bondholders do face considerable losses if the in-
junction is upheld. But these bondholders (unlike the third-party 
intermediaries) were warned of the risks of lurking holdout credi-
tors when they accepted the exchange bonds.  In any event, since 
Argentina can in fact comply with the injunction by continuing 
payment to the exchange bondholder while also paying off the 
holdouts, the decision to impose costs on the third parties is largely 
Argentina’s responsibility. 
 In any event, the pari passu theory was first invoked in the late 
                                                     
70  There is evidence that many sovereigns have already altered their debt 
contracts in this way.  See Presentation by Elena Duggar, Argentina is Unique – Impli-
cations for Sovereign Debt Restructurings (Dec. 11, 2013), available at 
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/multimedia/why-argentinas-
unique.ppt (stating that the “vast majority” of debt issuances after 2003 have col-
lective action clauses allowing a super majority of creditors to override holdouts). 
71  Weidemaier & Gelpern, supra note 5, at 213. 
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1990s, but it did not spur a flood of holdout litigation.  In fact, as 
Elena Duggan of Moody’s Investor Service has argued, the vast 
majority of sovereign restructurings that have taken place since 
1997 have been resolved without holdout litigation or drawn out 
negotiations.72 
 
5. THE CONTINUING ADVANTAGES OF                                               
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN DEBTORS IN U.S. COURTS 
 
Critics of the holdouts rarely consider the policy consequences 
of excessive protections that sovereigns currently enjoy.73  The ex-
isting law of foreign sovereign immunity in the United States 
makes a mockery of sovereign debt instruments that assure inves-
tors of recourse to U.S. courts.  Such waivers, like that made by Ar-
gentina in 1994, are essentially meaningless without resort to crea-
tive solutions like the pari passu clause.  As the NML v. Argentina 
saga has illustrated, sovereigns are largely unconstrained by U.S. 
court orders and judgments when it comes to their debt instru-
ments.  Indeed, despite the court rulings against it, Argentina has 
still not settled with its holdout creditors and has made plans to 
circumvent the court orders through new bonds issued under Ar-
gentina law. 
Despite making elaborate waivers, sovereigns are functionally 
immune from litigation in U.S. courts.  They still hold all the cards 
in restructuring negotiations with creditors.  Pari passu is the only 
current path to impose some measure of formal legal accountabil-
ity on sovereign defaulters like Argentina.  And even this account-
ability is unlikely to extend very broadly in the future since future 
sovereigns (and third parties) can plan ahead to avoid similar in-
junctions. 
As the fierce litigation over the pari passu clause indicates, sov-
ereigns, supported by their third-party intermediaries, will strong-
ly resist any attempt to use court injunctions to collect on unpaid 
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sovereign debt.  Moreover, it is still possible, even with a favorable 
pari passu clause interpretation, for a sovereign to continue to park 
assets in the United States while the holdout creditors attempt to 
collect from third-party intermediaries.  This may simply allow 
sovereigns like Argentina to offload their costs onto those third 
parties.  Pari passu has resulted in the strongest pressure on Argen-
tina to date, but it may still allow Argentina to largely escape its 
debt obligations. 
Under current U.S. law, foreign defendant sovereigns can issue 
explicit waivers of their immunity from attachment and execution, 
but these waivers are largely empty exercises given the limitations 
U.S. law places on the scope of such waivers. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The fallout from a holdout creditor victory in the Argentina 
debt wars will almost certainly not be as large as Argentina claims 
and hardly justifies the calls for drastic reform at the international 
level.  As this Article has suggested, U.S. law remains extremely 
favorable toward foreign sovereign debtors, even when those for-
eign sovereigns have explicitly waived their immunities.  The bal-
ance before the holdouts’ victory was already tipped very far in fa-
vor of sovereign defaulters such as Argentina, and the recent 
decisions have not significantly changed the balance.  While there 
may be reasons to support a new SDRM, the danger of U.S. litiga-
tion against foreign sovereign defaulters is not one of them. 
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